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NEW ETHICAL RELATIONSHIPS UNDER HEALTH CARE'S NEW
STRUCTURE: THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM
ROBERT I. FIELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
M ANAGED care is changing the entire business structure of health
care as it spreads as a financing mechanism. These changes affect all
aspects of medicine, not simply the method of reimbursement. Such
changes affect everything from business relationships to clinical practices.
As a result, all players in the system are seeing new roles and duties in the
ways that they provide and receive health care services.
With new roles and relationships come new ethical responsibilities.
Physicians no longer fulfill the same set of duties for patients when man-
aged care companies actively involve themselves in care decisions. They
must balance outside pressures against their own clinical judgment. Pa-
tients are no longer passive recipients of care relying on the professional
judgment of others. They must choose from a variety of managed care
plans and health care systems offering different levels of coverage. Insur-
ers are no longer impartial participants in the delivery of health care serv-
ices, providing reimbursement with minimal regard to their utility. What
is more, new organizations that integrate the provision of different levels
of health care services are being created, and they fulfill roles in health
care delivery that formerly did not exist. As a result, traditional notions of
ethical duties no longer automatically apply, and many legal rules that im-
plement those duties are quickly becoming obsolete.
This Article describes the reasons for the spread of managed care and
its consequences in the restructuring of clinical and business relation-
ships.1 It then examines the ethical and legal conflicts that these new rela-
tionships pose for major players in the system.2 Finally, it proposes a basis
for evaluating those conflicts in the restructured health care system.3
* A.B., 1974, magna cum laude, Harvard College; J.D., 1977, Columbia Law
School; M.P.H., 1980, Harvard School of Public Health; Ph.D., 1987, Boston
University. The author is presently Director of Physician Network Development,
University of Pennsylvania Health System; Lecturer in Health Care Systems, the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; Lecturer in Law, Villanova
University School of Law; and Senior Fellow, Leonard Davis Institute of Health
Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
1. For a further discussion of the spread of managed care, see infra notes 4-31
and accompanying text.
2. For a further discussion of the legal and ethical conflicts that may arise, see
infra notes 32-65 and accompanying text.
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II. RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
A. The Spread of Managed Care to Control Costs
In traditional medical practice, the provider, usually the physician,
made largely unsupervised decisions as to the use of health care services
on behalf of individual patients. Physicians were bound by ethical dictates
to direct patients to obtain services or to render those services themselves
based only on their professional judgment of the patient's medical needs.4
Rarely did an outside party second guess their decisions. Insurers reim-
bursed for medical services based largely on trust in the physician's judg-
ment that the services were needed. In most cases, the insurer's decision
was not determined by whether the treatment was appropriate for the par-
ticular patient, but whether the treatment had been shown overall to serve
a valid medical purpose. This system became known as fee-for-service
medicine, because reimbursement was based on a fee for each service
rendered.
5
Use of the fee-for-service reimbursement system coincided with a dra-
matic explosion in the size of the health care industry. 6 From the 1940s
through the 1960s, the number of physicians and hospital beds in the
United States grew several fold. 7 The amount of money spent on health
4. The preamble to the American Medical Association's (AMA's) Principles of
Medical Ethics provides that "a physician shall be dedicated to providing competent
medical service with compassion and respect for human dignity." See AMERICAN
MED. Ass'N, Principles of Medical Ethics (1980), reprinted in BIOETHICs 22, 41 (Rem
B. Edwards & Glenn C. Graber eds., 1988).
5. See Christine Gasparovich, Note, Preferred Provider Organizations and Provider
Contracting: New Analysis Under the Sherman Act, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 377 n.3
(1985). In a fee-for-service system, the patient pays a fee to the doctor when the
medical service is rendered. See id. The patient is able to choose any health care
provider he or she chooses. See id. Moreover, an independent physician "deter-
mines what service . . . is necessary, provides that service, and sets an indepen-
dently determined price." Id. Under such a system, a physician is given a great deal
of autonomy, with ultimate control over his or her output and the price that is
charged. See id.
Some commentators believe that the fee-for-service system has directly con-
tributed to the escalating cost of health care. SeeJonathan Harding, The Physician's
Role in Managed Care: Quality Management, Quality Assurance, and Quality Improve-
ment, in CRTICAL CONCEPTS IN MEDICAL PRACTICE MANAGEMENT 133, 134 (Robert
Tallon ed., 1996) (discussing fee-for-service medicine and rise in cost of medical
care).
6. See Harding, supra note 5, at 134 (discussing growth of health care industry
during height of fee-for-service medicine). Harding argues that "[u]nmanaged
fee-for-service care in this country led to over-building of hospitals and high tech-
nology equipment with a concomitant expanding spiral of utilization and costs."
Id. For a further discussion on the growth of the health care industry and statistics
on the growth in health care costs, see BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAw 853
(1995) (noting rise in health care expenditures from $2590 per family in 1980 to
$7739 per family in 1993). '
7. See Eli Ginzberg, How Many Physicians Are Enough, 468 ANNALS 205, 209
(1983) (noting nearly 30% increase in number of physicians in decades after
World War II); see also AMERICAN Hosp. ASS'N, 1984 HOSPITAL STATISTICS at xvii-xxiii
(1984), reprinted in ALAN L. SORKIN, HEALTH CARE AND THE CHANGING ECONOMIC
[Vol. 43: p. 467
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care services followed suit, with consequent rises in premiums for health
insurance.8 By the 1970s and into the 1980s, the annual rise in health
insurance premiums was outstripping the general rate of inflation by a
factor of approximately two each year.9
Observers note that fee-for-service reimbursement, with payment
based almost solely on the physician's judgment of medical necessity, con-
tains no disincentive for treatments that are not needed or are of marginal
benefit. 10 Under fee-for-service reimbursement, physicians and patients
are buffered from the financial consequences of ordering and receiving
treatments and, therefore, have no direct incentive to be fiscally pru-
dent. 1 For example, one study indicates the propensity of physicians to
"game" fee-for-service reimbursement systems by increasing the volume of
ENVIRONMENT 70 (1986) (stating that by 1970 there were 848,000 nonfederal short-
term hospital beds in United States, up from 505,000 in 1950). Between 1950 and
1970, the average expense per patient per day in a hospital had risen from $15.62
to $81.58 and expenses per stay increased from $127.26 to $668.96. See id.
8. See Earlene P. Weiner, Note, Managed Health Care: HMO Corporate Liability,
Independent Contractors, and the Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 15 J. CORP. L. 535, 535-36
(1990) (discussing increased health care costs and insurance premiums). In 1965,
approximately 5.9% of the United States' gross domestic product (GDP), or $42
billion, was spent on health care. See id. By 1990, that number had grown to
nearly 12% or about $590 billion of the GDP. See id. This expenditure is ex-
traordinary when compared to the amount of money spent by other countries. See
FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 853 ("In 1991 the United States spent $2868 per
capita, 13.2% of its gross domestic product for health care, compared to $1659 per
capita or 8.5% of GDP in Germany; $1307 or 6.8% of GDP in Japan; or $1403 or
6.6% of GDP in the United Kingdom."). This increase has been accompanied by
an increase in insurance premiums that during a similar period had increased at a
rate of 15% to 20% per year. See Weiner, supra, at 536; see also LauraJ. Schacht,
Note, The Health Care Crisis: Improving Access for Employees Covered by Self-Insured
Health Plans Under ERSA and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 45 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 303, 310 (1994) (noting that to offset increases in health care costs,
insurance premiums increased at annual average rate of 21%).
9. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 893 (noting that health care costs have
grown at twice the level of inflation); see also Schacht, supra note 8, at 309-10
("Health care costs have increased annually by more than ten percent, while infla-
tion [has risen] less than five percent.").
10. See Leslie C. Giordani, Comment, A Cost Containment Malpractice Defense:
Implications for the Standard of Care and for Indigent Patients, 26 Hous. L. REv. 1007,
1009 (1989) ("[The fee-for-service] system provides no disincentives to prevent
spending for useless or marginally useful procedures."). The effects of managed
care and fee-for-service reimbursement on physician incentives is discussed in let-
ters to the editor in the New England Journal of Medicine. See Letter from Steven
Snyder, M.D., 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1085 (1997) (criticizing fee-for-service system
for its failure to control costs).
11. See Harding, supra note 5, at 134 (arguing that in fee-for-service system,
patients and hospitals do not have economic incentives to demand lower costs).
Fee-for-service reimbursement can be linked to the increased cost of health care
because it created a system in which "[platients were no longer responsible for
payment." Id. Because patients are isolated from the costs of care by an insurance
buffer, "they no longer demanded lower costs." Id. But see MICHAEL D. REAGAN,
CURING THE CIUSIS, OPTIONS FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE 77-78 (1992) (arguing
that fee-for-service system is not necessarily major cost escalator).
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treatments they provide in response to reductions in fee schedule pay-
ments. 12 In particular, it is observed that fee-for-service medicine rewards
physicians financially for overtreating and can encourage financial rela-
tionships among physicians, hospitals and other providers that promote
referrals among them for treatments of dubious value.' 3 Abuses related to
this conflict motivated the enactment of laws restricting self-referrals.
1 4
12. See Nguyen Xuan Nguyen and Frederick William Derrick, Physician Behav-
ioral Response to a Medicare Price Reduction, 32 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 283, 283-84
(1997) (finding possible connection between fee reductions and increased volume
of services). As a result of such a connection, some commentators have cautioned
against price controls as a method of dealing with the increased cost of medical
care. See id. The argument is that any savings induced by price controls could be
offset by behavioral responses of health care providers. See id. Thus, one commen-
tator noted:
Price controls have been argued to be an effective tool for reducing both
the level and the rate of growth of health spending in the United States
.... The savings, however, may be partially countered by the behavioral
response. These are volume increases initiated by providers, particularly
physicians, who provide more health care goods and services in order to
recapture lost revenues. A substantial behavioral response would dimin-
ish the potency of price control as an instrument for containing
expenditures.
Id.
13. See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud by Health Care
Providers, 38 VILL. L. REv. 1003, 1008-15 (1993) (discussing potential for fraud in
fee-for-service reimbursement arrangements). According to one commentator, the
fee-for-service system is a disaster from the antifraud perspective. See id. at 1008-09
(discussing types of fraud inherent in fee-for-service medicine). Bucy stated that
[t]o the fraudulent provider, fee-for-service reimbursement encourages
the following types of fraud: (1) billing for services not provided; (2) bill-
ing for more expensive service than was actually provided; (3) providing
and billing for unnecessary services while representing that the services
were necessary; and, (4) paying kickbacks for referrals, including self-
referrals.
Id. at 1009.
14. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a to 1320-7b (1994) (addressing abuses in-
volving federal health care plans). The federal Medicare Act makes it illegal to
offer or receive remuneration in return for the referral of patients for services that
may be reimbursed by Medicare. See id. § 1320a-7b(b). The act provides that
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any renumeration
(including any kickbacks, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly
or covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnish-
ing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which
payment may be made in whole or in part [under a Federal or State
health care program] . . . or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility,
service or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
[under a Federal or State health care program] ... shall be guilty of
a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any renumeration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
4
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In response to the perceived cost pressures of fee-for-service reim-
bursement, managed care plans spread as an alternative. 15 In managed
care organizations, the payment of fees for services rendered is no longer
the basis for insurance reimbursement. 16 Promoted by federal legislation
in the early 1970s, managed care plans in the form of health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) grew on their own in the 1980s and 1990s by offer-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part [under a Federal or State health care pro-
gram) ... or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchas-
ing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which
payment may be made in whole or in part [under a Federal or State
health care program] .. -shall be guilty of a felony and upon convic-
tion thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for
not more than five years, or both.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(9) (addressing self-referral abuses). Under the
Stark amendments, it is illegal to refer a patient for Medicare services to an entity
with which the referring physician has a financial relationship. See id. The statute
provides:
(1) In general -
[I]f a physician (or an immediate family member of such physician) has a
financial relationship with an entity specified in paragraph (2), then-
(A) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the fur-
nishing of designated health services for which payment otherwise
may be made under this subchapter, and
(B) the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim
under this subchapter or bill to any individual, third party payor, or
other entity designated for health services furnished pursuant to a
referral prohibited under subparagraph (A).
Id.
15. See Allison Faber Walsh, Comment, The Legal Attack on Cost Containment
Mechanisms: The Expansion of Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations,
31 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 207, 210 (1997) (discussing rise of managed care as at-
tempt to curb escalating cost of health care). Managed care is a broad term that is
used to cover a wide array of financing arrangements used in the provision of
health care. See Sharon L. Davies & Timothy StoltzfusJost, Managed Care: Placebo or
Wonder Drug for Health CareFraud andAbuse?, 31 GA. L. REv. 373, 379 (1997). While
the term defies precise definition, managed care can generally be said to "denote
health care financing arrangements that attempt to control health care costs by
modifying the behavior of providers through clinical rules and financial incentives,
that restrict enrolled consumers' access to providers and care, and that attempt to
integrate the delivery and financing of health care." Id.
16. See generally Stephen R. Latham, Regulations of Managed Care Incentive Pay-
ments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 401-05 (1996) (discussing reimburse-
ment methods under managed care plans). Managed care plans reimburse
physicians in a number of different ways. See id. at 401. There are two broad meth-
ods of paying physicians: basic payment arrangements and incentive payment ar-
rangements. See id. With a basic payment arrangement, "physicians receive the
bulk of their payment for the medical services they supply." Id. at 402. An incen-
tive payment arrangement modifies "the basic payment structure to enhance physi-
cians' incentives to provide cost-effective care." Id.
5
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ing premiums at substantially lower rates than traditional insurance. 17
The basic approach of HMOs is to lower costs by directly and aggressively
reviewing care at several levels before reimbursement and by reversing the
financial incentives of physicians that promote overtreatment.1 8 All care is
channeled through the patient's primary care provider (PCP), a generalist
physician who must approve referrals for specialty care and hospitaliza-
tions. Many services are also reviewed by the HMO before payment is ap-
proved. PCPs are paid based on capitation, a set fee per patient per
month that does not vary with increased treatment, so there is no financial
gain from overtreating. Physicians may also receive an annual bonus that is
inversely related to the number of referrals for specialty and hospital care
as an additional disincentive to overrefer.
B. Consequent Changes in Industry Focus
The spread of HMOs has resulted in profound consequences for the
structure of the health care industry beyond the change in the method of
payment. The new form of reimbursement has created new players in the
system and shifted the balance of power among players. Most signifi-
cantly, the rise of managed care has promoted dramatic consolidation on
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9 (requiring employers of 25 or more employees to
extend option of HMO membership to all employees). The original statute pro-
vided in relevant part:
Each employer ... [that] employed an average of employees of not less
than twenty-five, shall ... include in any health benefits plan offered to its
employees... the option of membership in qualified health maintenance
organizations which are engaged in the provisions of basic and supple-
mental health services in the areas in which such employees reside.
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, § 1310, 87 Stat.
914 (amended 1976).
The growth of managed care became particularly evident in the early 1990s.
See generally WALTER A. ZELMAN, THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE 2-6
(1996) (discussing several developments of 1990s that led to rise of managed
care). Furthermore, the gap in premium cost between managed care organiza-
tions and fee-for-service plans began to grow. See id. At the same time, rates of
increase in premiums in managed care organizations declined. See id. "The result
was a modest stampede toward managed care .... [B]etween 1988 and 1994, the
proportion of the population with employer-sponsored insurance who were in
[managed care organizations] rose from 29 percent to 70 percent .... By the end
of 1994 over fifty million people were enrolled in HMOs." Id. at 3; see Harding,
supra note 5, at 133 (stating that number of HMOs skyrocketed from under 23
million in 1985 to roughly 50 million in 1994).
18. See Thomas Palay, Relational Contracting, Transaction Cost Economics and the
Governance of HMOs, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 927, 942 (1986) (commenting on HMO incen-
tives for physicians to control referrals and hospital utilization and their effect on
physician behavior); Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial Incentives to Limit Services:
Should Physicians Be Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1824
(1995) (contrasting compensation arrangements in new managed care structures
when primary care physicians have incentives to deliver less care to patients be-
cause they share financial risk with providers with incentives provided by tradi-
tional fee-for-service indemnity plans where compensation structure encouraged
physicians to deliver more care to patients).
[Vol. 43: p. 467
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the provider side and new approaches to the delivery of health care
services.
1. Increased Value of Primary Care
HMOs tightly control patient referrals to specialists and hospitals.1 9
Primary care physicians in HMOs can no longer recommend that a patient
seek treatment from whomever they think best, because HMOs generally
only permit referrals to providers within their systems. Moreover, as dis-
cussed, primary care physicians face financial incentives to limit referrals
altogether. 20 A significant consequence is the need for specialists and hos-
pitals to safeguard their referral sources. They can no longer count on
personal and professional relationships with primary care physicians to
create a flow of patients. Moreover, primary care physicians may become
employed by or otherwise join with organizations controlled by competing
specialists and hospitals who demand their referrals. This instability of
primary care relationships has created a competitive race among special-
ists and hospitals to secure a primary care base.
2. Consolidation
If the provider side of the industry remains fragmented, managed
care companies have considerable bargaining power. They can threaten
individual physicians with deselection, exclusion from their plan, if they
do not accept mandated rates, or they can steer patients away from physi-
cians and hospitals that insist on maintaining high prices.2 1 In some mar-
19. See Robert Vilensky, The Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations, 69
N.Y. ST. B.J. 20, 20 (1997) (stating that, in addition to cost-containment devices,
HMOs withhold fixed percentage of doctor's fee "pending economic, quality and
utilization profiling"). Such devices provide incentives for doctors to refuse to re-
fer their patients to specialists and hospitals. See id.
20. SeeJames F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health
Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 210
(1996) (finding capitated system of provider reimbursement gives health care
providers financial incentives to utilize fewer ancillary services, tests and referrals);
Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability,
31 GA. L. Riv. 419, 470 (1997) (stating that financial incentive plans imposed by
HMOs have limited patient referrals); Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physi-
cians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1743-44
(1987) (commenting on financial incentives for physicians to limit their use of
services and referrals, possibly leading to conflicts with patients' best interests);
Barbara H. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to
the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1219, 1225-26 (1997) (noting
that both salary and capitation approaches to physician compensation will result in
physicians limiting amount of care delivered and referrals to specialists and
hospitals).
21. See Bryan A. Liang, Deselection Under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow for Main-
taining Patient-Physician Relationships in the Era of Managed Care?, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 799, 801-02 (1997) (stating that physician dependence on managed care com-
panies, given current health care climate, place physicians at mercy of managed
care companies' rates and requirements for fear of deselection and loss of patients
and livelihood); Larry J. Pittman, "Any Willing Provider" Laws and ERISA's Saving
7
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kets, there are only a handful of managed care plans that control a
considerable share of the market. Deselection can cause physicians con-
siderable financial harm. Moreover, in many markets, there are more phy-
sicians and hospital beds than the HMOs need to fill their panels,
engendering additional competitive pressures on providers. By consolidat-
ing, providers gain strength in bargaining with HMOs.
3. Importance of Efficiency
HMOs negotiate reimbursement to hospitals and physicians at rates
representing the lowest amount that the provider can afford to accept,
generally covering only the marginal costs of providing care.2 2 The rates
do not cover, as Medicare and some traditional insurance does, additional
expenses such as medical education, research or expansion. Without be-
ing able to build a margin for other expenses into their reimbursement,
hospitals and physicians must be much more financially cautious. Because
revenues are declining under more limited HMO reimbursement, there is
pressure to control expenses by becoming more efficient.
III. CONSEQUENCES or THE NEW INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
A. Consolidation into Integrated Systems
The pressures of dealing with managed care have led to the creation
of groupings of providers to negotiate jointly with HMOs. These group-
ings include facilities and individual practitioners providing different
levels of care so that a continuum can be offered in a single organization.
The most organized and consolidated grouping is an integrated delivery
system (IDS), a combination of providers at all levels of care into a single
organization.2 3 IDSs generally include at least one tertiary hospital, one
or more community hospitals, specialist physicians, primary care physi-
cians and providers of ancillary services such as laboratory, radiology and
Clause: A New Solution for an Old Problem, 64 TENN. L. REv. 409, 435 (1997) (finding
that managed care companies deselect more costly physicians from provider lists);
Jennifer L. D'Isidori, Note, Stop Gagging Physicians!, HEALTH MATRIX, Winter 1997,
at 187, 233 (illustrating effect of HMO deselection on physicians and effects
deselection has on physicians' practices).
22. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 491, 499 (1997) (explaining that HMOs put hospitals and physicians
at risk by paying negotiated per diem rates per case). Danzon reasons that because
low level capitation forms of reimbursement allow physicians no additional means
to generate revenue to cover the costs of added services or tests they have "incen-
tives to provide too little care." Id.; see Note, The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on
the Uninsured, 110 HARv. L. Rv. 751, 754 (1997) (noting that HMO requirements
that patient-enrollees visit limited panels of approved providers result in HMOs
negotiating discounts from providers, networks or physicians bearing financial risk
of loss).
23. See John D. Columbo, Health Care Reform and Federal Tax Exemption: Re-
thinking the Issues, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 215, 236 (1994) (noting that rise of first
integrated health delivery systems occurred in early 1990s).
[Vol. 43: p. 467
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physical therapy. They can be structured in many different ways, includ-
ing control by a physician-led organization or ownership by a hospital. 24
They may own their own HMO or receive reimbursement through con-
tracts with HMOs. The most significant common feature is that they offer
to providers the essential business advantages of a consolidated
structure.
25
By combining into an IDS, providers can gain the three necessary ele-
ments needed to negotiate with HMOs described above: a secure primary
care base, strength in size and a means for promoting efficiency. Every IDS
includes a complement of primary care physicians, either directly em-
ployed or under contract, who serve as PCPs for HMO members under
capitation arrangements and will guarantee the accessibility of the system
to patients. By growing larger to gain market share, IDSs can make it more
difficult for HMOs to decline to contract with them. By controlling all
levels of care, they can reduce duplication of services and can facilitate
better coordination among different kinds of providers, making the provi-
sion of care more efficient. 26
B. Consequences of IDS Growth and Full-Risk Capitation
The growth of IDSs and their new relationships with HMOs are begin-
ning to produce significant changes in the structure of health care deliv-
ery.27 Many of these changes will enhance patient care and access to
health care services. The more substantial changes are creating a system
that is more centralized, but also better coordinated than the present one.
By affecting the provision of care at a clinical level, however, they raise new
ethical and legal concerns. Several of these changes are of particular in-
terest in their conflicting effects.
24. See id. at 236-37 (discussing California foundation IDS model). One com-
mentator noted:
In the foundation model, a central entity (the "foundation") controls and
manages all the medical facilities in the network, including acute care
facilities and clinics. The foundation contracts directly with consumers
and insurance companies to provide health care services. The founda-
tion then contracts with doctors and other professionals to provide the
promised medical services to the foundation's consumers.
Id.
25. See Danzon, supra note 22 at 499 (noting that IDSs offer "potential effi-
ciency gains in the bearing of risk, more cost-effective substitution among services,
economies of scale and scope, and monitoring of quality").
26. See Danzon, supra note 22, at 499 (noting that net effect of IDS potential
efficiency gains "is likely to be a reduction in the need for liability").
27. See Columbo, supra note 23, at 236 (noting that HMO and IDS systems
bring efficiency and cost reduction to health care delivery); NiaJ. Crimm, Evolu-
tionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures: A
Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REv. 1, 114-15 (1995) (discussing
impact of IDSs and HMOs on structure of health care delivery).
1998]
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1. Physicians as Employees
Many physicians who used to practice as independent businesses now
draw regular salaries as employees of larger organizations. They thereby
become accountable to corporate entities as well as to themselves and
their patients. 28 At the same time, the incentive to maximize revenues
and to control expenses that owners of a small business directly face are
greatly attenuated when a regular salary is guaranteed. Attention to effi-
ciency may suffer as a result.29
2. Large Primary Care Centers
By owning large numbers of primary care practices, IDSs can seek
economies of scale by combining offices into larger regional centers.
These centers compensate for their reduced geographic dispersion by of-
fering longer hours and more modern facilities. Personal attention to pa-
tients, however, may be reduced.
3. Specialization in Primary Care
Large primary care centers become more efficient when they can
triage care to the appropriate level. Within the scope of primary care,
patients can be directed based on the complexity and nature of their
needs. For example, nurse practitioners can treat routine conditions, and
psychologists, social workers, nutrition counselors and occupational ther-
apists can address specialized needs in a primary setting. This broadening
of primary care services may come at the cost of a reduction in specialty
care.
4. Coordination of Care Across Levels
A single IDS can follow patients across different levels of care to en-
sure, among other elements, that referrals are appropriate, records are
transferred and information is exchanged between providers. Under the
present system, referral relationships between providers are not systema-
tized, but they depend on individual physician and patient preferences. A
result is often a lack of overall coordination in patient care. Supervision of
referrals by an IDS, however, can introduce outsiders into clinical relation-
ships whose interests may more directly reflect financial rather than
clinical considerations.
28. See Alycia C. Regan, Regulating the Business of Medicine: Models for Integrating
Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 635, 638 (1997) (noting that
physicians in managed care organizations are accountable to administrators who
review treatment recommendations for medical and financial appropriateness).
29. A line of research indicates that productivity declines when physicians
switch from private practice to employment settings. See Mark A. Hall, Institutional
Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA.
L. REv. 431, 484-88 (1988) (noting individual practice association studies showing
that when physicians switch from individual practice to HMOs, financial risk or
reward is not enough to encourage efficiency and alter treatment patterns).
[Vol. 43: p. 467
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5. Protocol-Driven Health Care
Many IDSs seek to promote efficiency through standardization of
treatments across physicians with protocols directing the process of treat-
ing common conditions. Those protocols developed to date focus on ex-
pensive chronic conditions for which physicians tend to exhibit wide
variations in treatment strategies and consequent variations in quality. Pro-
tocols can reduce innovation, however, as well as promoting consistency.
6. Computerized Information Systems
Coordination of care, implementation of protocols and utilization
profiling require sophisticated information technology. Because the ac-
tual management of clinical care is involved, this technology requires com-
plexity well beyond that of traditional medical information systems. The
technology to meet these new needs is rapidly evolving, but the mainte-
nance of automated data bases exacerbates confidentiality concerns re-
garding sensitive patient information.
3 0
7. Proliferation of Data for Consumers
The monitoring and direction of medical care results in the produc-
tion of large amounts of data on provider performance. This data is in-
creasingly becoming available to insurers and employers who purchase
health care for insured members and employees. Gradually, much of this
data is also becoming available to the general public to guide the selection
of physicians and hospitals. The information may be difficult for patients
to use, however, because considerable sophistication is required for its
interpretation.
8. Patient-Focused Marketing to Recruit and Retain IDS Members
The ability of IDSs to command attractive managed care contracts is
directly proportional to the number of patients choosing their services. As
a result, they often market themselves directly to prospective patients
through advertisements and other forms of promotion. They also try to
improve patient amenities, such as parking and decor at facilities, to make
30. For further discussion of the confidentiality issues raised in the computer-
ization of medical information, see Robert I. Field, Overview: Computerized Medical
Records Create New Legal and Business Confidentiality Problems, HEALTHSPAN, Nov.
1994, at 3, 3 (noting that with computerization of medical information, significant
threats have surfaced regarding confidentiality). As this author noted:
The nature of computerized information also makes it easier for informa-
tion to be inadvertently released or to be covertly altered. . , . Without
strong security protections, a computer user with the proper access code
can retrieve massive amounts of personal medical information from a re-
mote location and print or copy unauthorized patient files. Even with
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themselves more attractive. Resources devoted to amenities, though, may
be diverted from clinical care.
9. Regression to the Mean in Quality
On the one hand, the increased attention to primary care will result
in improved accessibility to basic care for many who previously found it
difficult to obtain. For example, many indigent patients who have relied
on hospital emergency rooms for routine primary care now have access to
primary physician offices through Medicaid managed care plans. On the
other hand, specialty care can be more limited through utilization review
and physician disincentives for referrals. The result is that those tradition-
ally underserved see their care improve and those traditionally well served
can see their care become more limited. From a public health perspec-
tive, the prevalence of managed care does not necessarily reduce or im-
prove health care quality in the aggregate, but rather standardizes quality
at an average level for all. 31
IV. NEW RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN HEALTH CARE
All of these changes taken together produce new relationships among
all players in the health care system. Changes occur, particularly in the
relationships between primary and specialty physicians, between hospitals
and physicians, between physicians and their patients and among those
who pay for care, those who deliver care and those who receive care. Phy-
sicians face some of the more obvious conflicts, but payors that are pro-
moting the changes and even patients are in new roles that require ethical
scrutiny. A context for analyzing the ethical and legal issues raised by
these new relationships is greatly needed.
A. Physicians
The most profound new ethical conflicts involve the role of physi-
cians, who are the focal point for the conflicting needs of patients, insur-
ers, IDSs, and themselves. It used to be clear that the ethical obligations of
physicians flowed only to their patients, as reflected in the Hippocratic
Oath. 32 Many physicians today, however, have contracts with insurers or
31. See Barry R. Furrow, Incentivizing Medical Practice: What (If Anything) Hap-
pens to Professionalism?, 1 WIDENER L. SyMP.J. 1, 32-33 (1996) (finding that managed
care plans form systems that tie payments to average care and standardize quality
at average level for all participants).
32. See STErAMAN's MEDICAL DIcrIONARy 716-17 (25th ed. 1990) (defining
Hippocratic Oath). Steadman's quotes the Hippocratic Oath as it appears in a
book of the hippocratic collection:
To consider dear to me as my parents him who taught me this art; to live
in common with him and if necessary to share my goods with him; to look
upon his children as my own brothers, to teach them this art if they so
desire without fee or written promise; to impart to my sons and the sons
of the master who taught me and the disciples who have enrolled them-
selves and have agreed to the rules of the profession, but to these alone,
[Vol. 43: p. 467
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IDSs that put additional parties into the equation. Conflicts are thereby
created in ethical duties to all of the other players in the system.
1. Duties to Employers
Physicians often have obligations under their employment contracts
with IDSs or affiliation agreements with HMOs to control costs, to keep
referrals in the system, to limit referrals and to look out for their em-
ployer's or network's interests. Failure to honor these obligations could
threaten the financial integrity of the system that employs them. More-
over, a physician's own financial interests may be harmed if his employer
suffers financially. Does this mean that physicians now have a duty to con-
sider the cost implications of their actions on patients, insurers and em-
ployers before recommending a course of treatment?33
Similar conflicts presently arise regarding occupational medicine phy-
sicians who work for companies and regarding psychotherapists in em-
the precepts and the instruction. I will prescribe regimen for the good of
my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm
to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give ad-
vice which may cause his death. Nor will I give a woman a pessary to
procure abortion. But I will preserve the purity of my life and my art. I
will not cut for stone, even for patients in whom the disease is manifest; I
will leave this operation to be performed by practitioners (specialists in
this art). In every house where I come I will enter only for the good of my
patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing and all seduc-
tion, and especially from the pleasures of love with women or with men,
be they free or slaves. All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise
of my profession or outside of my profession or in daily commerce with
men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will
never reveal. If I keep this oath faithfully, may I enjoy my life and never
reveal. If I keep this oath faithfully, may I enjoy my life and practice my
art, respected by all men and in all times; but if I swerve from it or violate
it, may the reverse be my lot.
Id.
33. SeeJeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine:
An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAD. L. REv. 445, 481 (1987)
("[I]nherent in the HMO structure is the risk that a physician's loyalty will be
divided between employer and patient, a risk no less evident in the HMO structure
than in the corporate structures held illegal under the corporate practice doctrine
decades earlier."); see also David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Phy-
sician Relationship, HEALTH MATIX, Winter 1995, at 141, 149 (commenting on
triple loyalty between personal financial interests of physicians, needs of patients
and the interests of society, resulting from cost consciousness in health care re-
form); Lisa Rediger Hayward, Comment, Revising Washington's Corporate Practice of
Medicine Doctrine, 71 WASH. L. Rv. 403, 425 (1996) (concluding that HMO struc-
ture "creates an inherent risk of physician loyalty to the corporation at the expense
of the patient"); Hillman, supra note 20, at 1743-44 (focusing on conflict of inter-
ests that may arise between patients' best interests and physicians' financial inter-
ests when HMOs and IDSs place financial incentives for physicians to limit their
use of services and referrals); Sara Mars, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A
Callfor Action, HEALTH MATRIX, Winter 1997, at 241, 261 (noting that HMO capita-
tion reimbursement may create incentives for physicians to underutilize care at
expense of patients' welfare).
13
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ployee assistance plans. In these examples, the physician's primary loyalty
is to an outside party, not to the patient. Is this the way all health care is to
become?
2. Duties to HMOs
Primary care physicians for HMOs are incentivized to limit referrals. 34
If a managed care company has a close relationship, such as an exclusive
contract with a physician, does the physician have an obligation to look
after the company's interests as part of that relationship? Do physicians
have any choice in deciding to look out for a company's interests if they
risk deselection or severe financial penalties for failing to do so?35
3. Duties to Patients
The most profound changes occur in physicians' relationships with
their patients. It has been argued that physicians have a new affirmative
duty to balance clinical and cost implications in their treatment deci-
sions.36 In particular, three kinds of conflicts with existing legal and ethi-
cal rules arise.
34. See Philip Boyle, Managed Care in Mental Health: A Cure, or a Cure Worse
Than the Disease?, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 437, 441 (1996) (concluding that HMO
financial incentives to control referrals result in incentives to undertreat patients);
William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and
Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 462 (1991) (noting that HMO payments to phy-
sicians based on capitation basis include "financial incentives directed toward min-
imizing specialist referrals and hospital utilization"); Jim M. Perdue & Stephen R.
Baxley, Cutting Costs-Cutting Care: Can Texas Managed Health Care Systems and
HMOs Be Liable for the Medical Malpractice of Physicians?, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 23, 26
(1995) (stating that HMOs establish schemes that discourage doctors from refer-
ring patients to specialists and hospitals);Jerome M. Staller, An HMO's Responsibil-
ity to Disclose Economic Incentives, 15 MED. MALIPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 3, 3 (1997)
(discussing HMO financial incentives for physicians to limit referrals).
35. See Liang, supra note 21, at 801-02 (stating that physician dependence on
managed care companies, given current health care climates, place physicians at
mercy of managed care companies' rates and requirements for fear of deselection
and loss of patients and livelihood).
36. See E. HAAvi MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF
MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS 2 (1995) (discussing balancing test in which
"[p]atients' interests must be weighed against the legitimate competing claims of
other patients, of payors, of society as a whole, and sometimes even of the physi-
cian himself"). Morreim argues that a new duty of care, requiring physicians to
consider resource utilization as well as medical needs in clinical decision making,
should evolve for clinical practice under managed care. See id. at 69-99 (discussing
dilemma faced by physicians, who have obligations to promote patient's best inter-
ests, including use of whatever resources are required and their ever decreasing
control over those resources).
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a. Advocacy for Patients
Recent case law has found a duty of physicians to vigorously appeal
coverage denials by insurers on behalf of their patients. 37 Physicians,
37. See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819-20 (Ct. App.) (finding that
physician who has primary responsibility in making medical decisions for patient
has duty to appeal denial of medical coverage for further treatment), vacated, 727
P.2d 753 (Cal. 1986). But see Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 879-80 (Ct.
App. 1990) (distinguishing Wickline and finding that language in Wickline, stating
that discharge is sole responsibility of physician, was dicta and did not "correctly
state the law relative to causation issues in a tort case").
Wickline was the first case to hold third-party payors potentially liable for the
consequences of refusing to authorize further medical treatment. See David D.
Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical Treatment Deci-
sions, 25 GA. L. REv. 861, 886 (1991). In Wickline, plaintiff was admitted to the
hospital for problems with her back and legs. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812. She
was diagnosed with having an obstructed aorta and a portion of the artery was
surgically removed and replaced with a synthetic one. See id. The plaintiff was eligi-
ble for medical benefits under a California state-administered medicaid program
that pre-authorized her admission to the hospital and surgery. See id. at 813-14.
The plaintiffs recovery went poorly; two more operations on the leg were re-
quired. See id. at 812. After these surgeries, the plaintiffs physician concluded that
she should remain in the hospital for eight more days. See id. at 813. The medi-
caid program in which she was enrolled rejected this request and only authorized a
stay of four additional days. See id. at 814. Soon after the plaintiff's discharge, her
leg became badly infected and ultimately needed to be amputated. See id. at 816-
17.
The plaintiff brought suit against the State of California, alleging that the
medicaid program negligently discontinued her eligibility, causing her to be dis-
charged prematurely while she was still in need of hospital care. See id. at 811. The
plaintiff further contended that her premature release resulted in the amputation
of her leg. See id. The Wickline court found the treating physician responsible for
the plaintiffs injuries, but it did not foreclose the possibility of third-party payor
liability. See id. at 819 ("Third party payors of health care services can be held
legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in
the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for example,
when appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrar-
ily ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden."). The court concluded its
opinion by emphasizing that cost containment programs must not be allowed to
taint a physician's medical judgment. See id. at 820 ("While we recognize, realisti-
cally, that cost consciousness has become a permanent feature of the health care
system, it is essential that cost limitation programs not be permitted to corrupt
medical judgment.").
In Wilson, the decedent was admitted to a hospital while suffering from de-
pression, drug addiction and anorexia. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 877. The treating
physician concluded that the decedent needed to remain in the hospital for at
least three weeks to receive the proper care. See id. Ten days after decedent ar-
rived at the hospital, his insurance company stated that it would no longer pay for
any further hospital care. See id. The decedent was discharged from the hospital
because he was unable to pay for any further inpatient care. See id. at 877-78.
Three weeks later, he committed suicide. See id. at 878.
The decedent's family brought suit against his insurance company and the
doctor who performed the case's utilization review. See id. at 880 (claiming breach
of insurance contract, negligence and wrongful death). The trial court relied on
Wickline in reasoning that the decedent's treating physician was responsible for the
early discharge from the hospital and granted the defendant insurance company's
summary judgment motions. See id. The court of appeals, however, distinguished
15
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therefore, seem to have a new legal duty to be patient advocates. Because
failure to appeal could jeopardize a patient's care, this may become a new
ethical duty consistent with the dictates of the Hippocratic Oath to make
their patients' interests paramount. 38 There is a logic to imposing this
burden, since the physician knows best what care is needed. How does a
physician pursue this duty, however, if he or she is an employee of the
organization issuing the denial? Can an employee be an effective advocate
against his or her own employer? Most legal cases to date have primarily
dealt with physicians under contractual relationships with HMOs, not with
physicians who are direct employees, which presents more of a direct con-
flict. The law, therefore, has yet to face the toughest dilemmas.
b. Abandonment of Patients
Common law in most states places physicians under an obligation to
continue a course of treatment to the end once a relationship with the
patient has been established, whether or not payment is made. 39 Under
traditional fee-for-service medicine, that relationship begins when the phy-
Wickline on many of the issues and found that much of the language in Wickline was
"overbroad ... and constituted dicta." Id. at 885. The court rejected the defend-
ant's major argument, premised on Wickline, that they were not responsible for the
plaintiff's discharge and death because such responsibilities rest with the physi-
cian. See id. at 879-80 (discussing defendant's Wickline-based arguments). The Wil-
son court concluded that "[t]he language in Wickline which suggests that civil
liability for a discharge decision rests solely within the responsibility of a treating
physician in all contexts is dicta." Id. at 880. Moreover, the court found that the
defendant's decision to discontinue payment for the decedent's hospitalization
may have played a significant role in the decedent's death. See id. at 883 (stating
that there is "sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact as to
whether [defendant's] conduct was a substantial factor in causing decedent's
death").
38. See LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPocRATIc OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND
INTERPRETATION 3 (Henry Sigerist ed., 1943) ("'I will apply dietetic measures for
the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from
harm and injustice."' (quoting Hippocratic Oath)).
39. See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1937) (finding that once
physician begins to treat patient, physician is obligated to continue treating patient
to end of course of treatment, regardless of whether payment has been made). In
Ricks, the plaintiff cut his finger on a piece of barbed wire and his hand subse-
quently became severely infected. See id. at 209-10. The plaintiff sought treatment
at the defendant's hospital, where he remained for several days. See id. at 210.
Having received treatment for his wound and paying for the services that the de-
fendant rendered, the plaintiff left the hospital over the objections of the defend-
ant. See id.
The defendant advised the plaintiff to continue the same treatment that had
been given to him at the hospital, and that if plaintiffs finger showed any signs of
becoming worse, he was to return to the hospital immediately. See id. Two days
after leaving the hospital, the plaintiff informed the defendant that the condition
of his finger had worsened and he needed further treatment. See id. Upon arriving
at the hospital, the defendant refused to treat the plaintiff until he paid all charges
he owed the defendant from a prior, unrelated service. See id. The plaintiff left the
defendant's hospital and entered another local hospital, where it was found that
he was in need of serious surgical and medical attention. See id. at 210-11. The
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sician agrees to see the patient as a regular patient or to commence an
agreed-upon course of treatment.40 In contrast to the traditional fee-for-
service system, a recent Texas case found that the physician-patient rela-
tionship under managed care begins when the patient subscribes to the
plan.41 In this situation, the court said, the patient had bought medical
services in advance and the physician was obligated to provide those serv-
ices under his contract with the HMO.
42
The nature of this responsibility raises numerous questions as it
evolves under managed care. Does the physician have an obligation to
continue to treat a managed care patient when the patient has left the
managed care panel or no longer has insurance that applies to the physi-
cian's IDS? Who will then pay for the patient's services? Is the physician
responsible for 'insuring that a patient's new IDS includes providers who
plaintiff remained at the other hospital for approximately one month, during
which time it became necessary to amputate his injured finger. See id. at 211.
The defendant argued that he had no contractual duty to treat the injured
plaintiff. See id. (arguing further that there was no evidence proving that defend-
ant's refusal to treat plaintiff resulted in any damage to plaintiffs hand). The court
rejected the defendants' arguments, stating: " 'When a physician is employed to
attend upon a sick person, his employment continues while the sickness lasts, un-
less put to an end by the assent of the parties, or revoked by the express dismissal
of the physician.'" Id. at 212 (quoting Lawson v. Conaway, 16 S.E. 564, 567 (W. Va.
1892)).
40. SeeWoolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1124 (Me. 1980) (noting that in
traditional fee-for-service medical practice physician-patient relationship is usually
consensual in nature stemming from implied or express contract). Nevertheless,
the Woolley court also noted that this relationship may exist where there is "clearly
no contractual relationship between the patient and the physician." Id. Thus, the
Woolley court asserted that in tradtional fee-for-service medicine, the physician-pa-
tient relationship begins as soon as the physician agrees to treat the patient. See id.
41. See Hand v. Tavera, 864 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that
physicians in managed care plans owe duty of care to patients, based on contract to
provide services through plan, for wrongfully refusing to approve admission to hos-
pital). In Hand, the plaintiff went to the Humana Hospital emergency room com-
plaining of a headache that he had for three days. See id. at 678-79. The plaintiff
had a history of high blood pressure, and the emergency room physician con-
cluded that the plaintiffs condition warranted that he be admitted to the hospital.
See id. at 679. The plaintiff presented a Humana Health Care Plan card to the front
desk. See id. The defendant, who was the doctor in charge of admissions, found
that the plaintiffs problems " 'should be controlled by outpatient medication and
follow-up in the office.'" Id. The plaintiff was sent home, and he suffered a stroke
several hours later. See id.
The defendant asserted that he and the plaintiff had never entered into a
physician-patient relationship and, therefore, he did not owe the plaintiff a duty.
See id. The court rejected this argument and held that "when the health-care
plan's insured shows up at a participating hospital emergency room, and the plan's
doctor on call is consulted about treatment or admission, there is a physician-pa-
tient relationship between the doctor and the insured." Id.
42. See id. at 680 ("[W]hen a patient who has enrolled in a prepaid medical
plan goes to a hospital emergency room and the plan's designated doctor is con-




Field: New Ethical Relationships under Health Care's New Structure: The
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
can competently continue a course of treatment before he or she can re-
linquish responsibility for treating that patient?
c. Confidentiality
Physicians have obligations under law and ethics to respect the confi-
dentiality of patient medical information. 43 Exceptions to this duty are
limited, such as situations involving direct threats of harm to third parties,
some kinds of public health threats, court orders and patient consent. 44
Generally, the patient records of employed physicians are owned by the
organization that employs them. Under these circumstances, can an em-
ployee keep important information from his or her employer? Might he or
she even have an affirmative duty to supply an employer with information?
For example, should an employed physician keep silent if he or she discov-
ers that a patient consistently seeks unnecessary treatment or otherwise
abuses the system thereby burdening the employer's financial resources?
These ethical questions raise particular conflicts for the laws gov-
erning the disclosure of medical information that presently receives spe-
cial confidentiality protection, such as human immunodeficiency virus
43. See, e.g., Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962)
(stating that members of medical profession stand in confidential or fiduciary ca-
pacity as to their patients and that this duty involves total care, including safe-
guarding of personal information). In Alexander, the plaintiffs were involved in an
automobile accident that required one of them to undergo extensive medical
treatment for neck and spine injuries. See id. at 143-45. A physician was employed
by the defendant's attorneys to interview the injured plaintiff's physicians and to
obtain a report from them. See id. at 146. The report was obtained for a $50 fee. See
id. Contained within the report was the physician's statement that the plainitiff's
injuries were "perpetuated by an underlying pre-existing anxiety neurosis and hys-
teria, centered about an hysterical personality." Id. at 145. The plaintiffs physi-
cian, however, never sought the plaintiff's consent before he issued the report. See
id. at 146. The court condemned the actions of the physician employed by the
defendant that induced the plaintiff's physician to breach his confidential relation-
ship with his own patient. See id. (stating that members of medical profession "owe
their patients more than just medical care for which payment is exacted; there is a
duty of total care; that includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in
litigation, to render reports when necessary and to attend court when needed").
The court also emphasized that the physician-patient relationship also encom-
passes a duty on the part of the physician "to refuse affirmative assistance to the
patient's antagonist in litigation." Id.
44. See Field, supra note 30, at 4 (discussing several exceptions to physician's
duty to maintain confidentiality of patient records). For example, most states have
statutes mandating that physicians and other health care providers inform public
health officials of cases of certain contagious diseases. See id. (noting that most
states have statutes also requiring physicians and other health care providers to
disclose instances of suspected child abuse to public welfare authorities). In addi-
tion, a physician may generally disclose a patient's medical records in response to a
subpoena and to other health care providers in accordance with the patient's con-
sent. See id.
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(HIV) status 45 and drug and alcohol treatment records. 46 Should all prov-
iders in an IDS be entitled to receive such information because the IDS
can be seen as one large provider responsible for all care, or should just
the treating physician receive it?4 7 An IDS needs access to at least some
clinical information if it is to adequately coordinate care. On a practical
level, however, how can it make this information widely available internally
and maintain confidentiality from outsiders?48
45. See Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7601-7612 (1993) (seeking to "protect individuals from inappropriate dis-
closure and subsequent misuse of confidential HIV-related information"). This
statue seeks to protect individuals by placing limitations on disclosure: "No person
or employee, or agent of such person, who obtains confidential HIV-related infor-
mation in the course of providing any health or social service or pursuant to a
release of confidential HIV-related information under subsection (c) may disclose
or be compelled to disclose the information ... ." Id. § 7607(a). Only those per-
sons specifically authorized by statute may receive a patient's confidential HIV-
related information. See id. Among those persons who may review a patient's HIV
records are the patient, the physician who ordered the test, an insurer and peer
review organizations. See id. (stating further that local health departments, persons
allowed access under court order and funeral directors responsible for preparing
deceased patient for burial may be granted access to patient's HIV-related
information).
46. See Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment
and Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994) (discussing confidentiality of
patient's records). In pertinent part, this statute provides that:
Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient
which are maintained in connection with the performance of any pro-
gram or activity relating to substance abuse education, prevention, train-
ing, treatment, rehabilitation, or research, which is conducted, regulated,
or directly or indirectly assisted by any department or agency of the
United States shall.., be confidential and be disclosed only for the pur-
poses and under the circumstances expressly authorized under ... this
section.
Id.
47. See generally JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF H.ALTHCARE ORcS.,
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOsPITALs 104 (1992) (requiring that institutions re-
spect rights of patients to "personal privacy and confidentiality of information"
within limits of law).
48. See, e.g., Ellen E. Schultz, Open Secrets: Medical Data Gathered by Firms Can
Prove Less Than Confidential, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1994, at Al (noting that some
employers provide company medical records, including psychotherapy records
from employee assistance programs, to their attorneys for use in defending work-
ers compensation claims). This Article notes that employers throughout the coun-
try are beginning to access a growing mountain of medical data on their
employees, and are becoming more aggressive about using the data, especially
when employees file for benefits claiming job-related injuries or stress. See id. (not-
ing that much of this medical data is collected through seemingly routine cost-
cutting steps such as health promotion programs, fitness surveys and employee
assistance programs, which encourage workers to seek counseling). More and
more, these records are used in ways employees did not anticipate. See id.
1998]
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B. Insurers
Despite their role as agents of change in health care, insurers face
new ethical conflicts of their own. In their traditional role under fee-for-
service reimbursement, insurers were primarily passive payors for care.
49
Their only intrusion into clinical decision making was to determine the
medical necessity of new treatments in the aggregate, not with regard to
their utility for individual patients. Under most health insurance policies,
as long as the insured patient's care was medically necessary as determined
by the provider, it would be covered and payment would be made.
Almost all care is now managed to at least some extent, and insurers
do not rely solely on providers to decide what is medically necessary. Insur-
ers in the form of HMOs now either closely oversee care or provide it
themselves through contracted or employed providers.5 0 To whom do in-
surers owe their loyalty in doing so?
1. Duties to Employers
By representing that they hold down costs, HMOs have made
promises to, and created expectations in, the payors of their premiums,
usually employers. 5 1 Traditional insurers merely charged whatever premi-
ums the market would bear and did not promise to actively manage
costs.5 2 HMOs have taken on an obligation to keep premiums low and
have promised to be prudent in spending employers' premium dollars in a
49. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 213 (noting that in traditional fee-for-service
systems "[p ] hysicians exerted exclusive control over the diagnosis and treatment of
patients and had complete discretion to choose the method and cost of treat-
ment"). Physicians would submit their bill for services to the insurance company
and receive "payment without question." Id. In such a system, both physician and
patient were insulated, thereby reducing any "incentive for the physician or patient
to maintain costs." Id.
50. See DianaJoseph Bearden & BryanJ. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability
in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285, 289 (1995) (noting that
HMOs "insure[ ] for the cost and provide[ ] for the delivery of health care services
by negotiating contractual arrangements with the health care providers to provide
comprehensive health care to the defined, voluntarily enrolled patient popula-
tion"); Michael Kanute, Evolving Theories of Malpractice Liability for HMOs, 20 Lov. U.
CHI. L.J. 841, 84144 (1989) (defining HMO and discussing several different mod-
els of HMOs); Chase-Lubitz, supra note 33, at 479 (noting that HMOs provide
services to their subscribers by contracting with various health care professionals);
see also Weiner, supra note 8, at 539-41 (discussing operation of HMOs and con-
trasting HMOs with traditional fee-for-service rendered health care plans).
51. See Northwest Med. Lab., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Or., Inc., 794
P.2d 428, 430-31 (Or. 1990) (noting that HMOs are attractive because they claim
to reduce costs of premiums to subscribers, reduce cost of services and provide
quality comparable to that of traditional indemnity programs).
52. See McGraw, supra note 18, at 1822-23 (stating that fee-for-service systems
did not try to contain costs of health care, rather "insurance insulated both benefi-
ciaries and providers from the costs of care, [thereby] creat[ing] no incentives to
reduce services to contain costs").
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way that traditional insurers did not.53 They are thereby taking on some
aspects of the role of financial fiduciaries. If they limit care, they will fulfill
this obligation. If they do not, they may have breached a promise and
perhaps a fiduciary duty to their customer.
2. Duties to Patients
If insurers are overseeing care, to what extent are they responsible to
the recipients of that care? Can they ethically interfere with the provision
of a service with life and death implications without keeping the best inter-
ests of the recipients of that service paramount? As a partial answer to that
question, a number of cases have imposed liability on HMOs for wrongly
denying needed care and for establishing financial incentives that cause
practitioners to do so.54 Some courts have found managed care plans lia-
ble for failing to approve needed treatments upon appeal by member
physicians. 5
5
These conflicts are exacerbated when the HMO is organized as a for-
profit company that is accountable to shareholders, rather than as a non-
profit corporation. In the case of for-profit organizations, there is a duty to
shareholders to increase the value of the company. The conflict between
duties to shareholders and to customers may be difficult when a routine
product or service is involved. When a service makes the difference be-
53. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 215 (noting that primary goal of HMOs is to
lower health care costs and accordingly to implement various cost containment
devices to limit treatment to patients and to provide physicians with incentives to
perform medical services at lower costs).
54. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir.) (concluding that
managed care organizations have fiduciary duty under ERISA to their plan mem-
bers and that failing to disclose doctor's financial incentive to limit care is breach
of that fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997); Ardary v. Aetna Health
Plans of Cal., Inc., 98 F.3d 496, 501 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that federal Medicare
act does not prevent state law claims against HMOs when claimants are seeking
damages for alleged improper denial of medical services and misrepresentation to
beneficiary of terms of plan); Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 885 (Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that insurer's refusal to approve further hospitalization
deemed necessary by insured's physician to treat depression, drug addiction and
anorexia created triable issue of whether utilization review of medical necessity of
hospitalization was substantial factor in causing insured's death); Pappas v. Asbel,
675 A.2d 711, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that claim by insured's husband,
who was rendered quadripelegic after HMO denied his transfer to nonaffiliated
hospital for treatment of spine injuries, was not preempted by ERISA); Billings v.
Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996) (holding insurer liable for
breach of express coverage and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing);
McEvay v. GroupHealth, 570 N.W.2d 397, 407 (Wis. 1997) (finding HMO liable for
breach of contract and bad faith in its failure to continue treatment of plaintiff's
anorexia nervosa).
55. See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 820 (Ct. App.) (finding third-
party payors potentially liable for consequences of refusing to authorize further
medical treatment), vacated, 727 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1986); see also Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr.
at 883 (stating that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise triable issue of
material fact as to whether insurer's conduct was substantial factor in causing dece-
dent's death).
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tween life and death, the conflict may be unresolvable. As a result, some
argue that, in the context of health care, corporate entities such as HMOs
cannot be treated merely as traditional profit-centered organizations. 56
HMOs serve both medical and business functions and should be treated as
having a foot in both camps. 57
3. Duties to Providers
Unlike most traditional insurers, HMOs have contracts directly with
hospitals and physicians, who may be paid under fee schedules, capitation
payments, case rates or other payment arrangements. Patients are gener-
ally absolved under HMO contracts and under state law from any direct
financial obligations to the providers who treat them.58 Such drastic
changes raise important isues. Because hospitals and physicians now rely
directly on insurers for their livelihood rather than on patient payments,
do insurers have a greater obligation to be fair in making payments and in
directing patients to use the services of contracted providers? With regard
to the provision of care, because HMOs are closely involved in rendering
care, do they have an obligation to insure that only competent profession-
als make treatment decisions? An affirmative answer to the latter question
would mean that HMOs have an obligation to oversee IDSs with whom
they contract to guarantee that appropriate clinicians render services.59
56. See Wendy K. Mariner, Business vs. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for
Managed Care, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHics 236, 236 (1995) (differentiating between
more well-established, nonprofit HMOs and newer for-profit organizations that fo-
cus on cost cutting and providing adequate returns on shareholders' investments).
Mariner notes that there is "implicit disagreement on whether the [socially ac-
cepted standards to judge plans by] should be based on principles of economics,
policy, or ethics." Id.
Mariner lists the following values by which to judge health care institutions:
"humaness, reciprocal benefit, trust, fairness, dignity, gratitude, service and stew-
ardship." Id. at 239 (citing StanleyJoel Reiser, The Ethical Life of Health Care Organi-
zations, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 28-35 (1994)). These values, however, "may
be incompatible with achieving the [managed care organization's] financial
goals." Id.
A further problem exists in education. For example, most business ethics text
books do not include discussions regarding organizations that deliver medical serv-
ices. See id. "Most tend to focus on ethical principles for individual personal con-
duct rather that the actions or policies of an organization." Id.
57. See id. at 241-43 ("[E]thical standards for MCOs should recognize the or-
ganizations' medical responsibilities as well as their business functions."). In
achieving this goal, Mariner emphasizes that the organization's purpose, unlike a
doctor's practice focusing on individual patients, is to ensure that all enrollees
receive proper care. See id. at 242. Mariner urges "acceptable solutions" to the in-
herent conflict arising between the needs of the population and the individual
client. See id. One such example is the elimination of "expensive, experimental
therapies in order to provide more preventative services." Id.
58. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1551-1568 (1993) (requiring that pa-
tients not be held liable for covered services under HMO contracts with providers).
59. See Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions Among Managed Care
Organizations, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHicS 223, 225 (1995) (discussing problems doc-
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Even patients face new ethical obligations giving rise to ethical con-
flicts under the new structure of health care. Previously, patients would
enter into a relationship with a physician who would treat them over a
course of time. The patient was essentially a passive recipient of services
rendered by an expert of the patient's choice. Now, the physician may
change when the patient's health plan does, or a patient may see a differ-
ent physician each time he or she visits the same primary care center. The
relationship is with the HMO or IDS, not with an individual physician.
Because patients cannot play the same passive roles as they had in the past,
they can now be considered as more active participants in health care deci-
sion making. 60 New ethical obligations may accompany this new posture.
1. Advocacy for Their Own Care
Patients can no longer expect services that their physician finds advis-
able to be covered by insurance reimbursement with minimal question.
Although physicians may have a legal obligation to appeal wrongful cover-
age denials and insurers may have a legal obligation to cover medically
necessary services, patients have chosen their insurance plan and their
PCP within the plan, whose conscientiousness with regard to those obliga-
tions may vary. Patients must be aware of the implications of coverage de-
terminations and of their rights regarding them to be effective consumers
who choose physicians and insurers and in order to thereby be effective
recipients of care. Patients, therefore, can be seen as sharing in the ethi-
cal obligations of physicians and insurers to see that care is adequately
provided.
It is not clear, however, how patients will assume such responsibility.
When care is denied, do patients have an obligation to appeal and to fight
for coverage? Can the burden be put on patients to pursue appeals with
payors or IDSs? Patients often lack the knowledge and sophistication to
tors face when "a stranger in another city, who has no clinical experience, calls the
doctor and tells her to discharge a patient, or denies approval for a test").
60. Recognizing that the role of patients in the new managed care environ-
ment is changing, some states have attempted to curb a perceived deterioration of
the physician-patient relationship. See Regan, supra note 28, at 642-43 (discussing
state regulation aimed at preventing managed care organizations from interfering
with certain communications between providers and patients); see also COLO. REV.
§ 10-16-121 (1) (a) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring certain contract provisions in con-
tracts between carriers and providers, including provision that carrier shall be pro-
hibited from "protesting or expressing disagreement" with medical decisions,
policies or practices of provider); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3303(8) (1989 & Supp.
1996) ("The [health insurance] policy shall contain no provision or nondisclosure
clause preventing physicians or other health care providers from giving patients
information regarding diagnoses, prognoses and treatment options."). These state
laws assume that if physicians and patients interact as independently as possible,
the quality of care will not decrease. Regan, supra note 28, at 642-43. Specifically,
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take such active roles and are certainly the most vulnerable players in the
system. Therefore, individual patient responsibility must be balanced
against the reasonable expectations of their capabilities.
2. Respecting the Financial Implications of Their Care
In many cases, patients will inevitably receive care that is not medi-
cally necessary, either because of their own or their physician's insistence.
Should they be responsible for the financial implications of receiving such
care? Policy makers observe that costs are an important element in overall
public health and cannot be analyzed independently of quality.6 1 Perhaps
patients now have a duty to avoid selfishness in demanding medical serv-
ices that they know to be of marginal value. For example, patients in
HMOs have less freedom to request diagnostic services that may provide
reassurance, but are not directly related to a demonstrated medical need.
Some argue that when a patient joins an HMO, he or she has made a
trade-off in which this freedom is reduced in return for lower premiums. 6
2
If patients do not respect the financial implications of this trade-off, they
have threatened the basis for health care cost control. Such behavior can
be seen as selfish in some circumstances and perhaps as ethically suspect.
3. Becoming Informed Consumers
HMOs and IDSs will compete based on cost and quality, which will be
demonstrated and marketed through statistical measures. The data and
analyses will likely be voluminous and difficult for an unsophisticated ana-
lyst to understand. 63 Should patients be responsible for making informed
61. See Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation Advances in Medical Technology, and the
Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 359 (1996) (discussing
cost implications in medical ethics). Malinowski stated: "The reality of modern
medicine, meaning the medicine of today and tomorrow, is that costs do matter.
They matter a great deal. Accordingly, medical ethics must acquire a social con-
science .... " Id. Additionally, any discussion of the balancing of cost and quality
must include the issue of health care rationing. Rationing techniques include in-
quiring into and prescribing less expensive drugs, avoiding unnecessary referrals
to specialists and denying treatments with marginal benefits. Id. at 340. To supple-
ment the effectiveness of rationing, Malinowski urges that "(1) patients under-
stand the limits of their coverage when they purchase it, (2) patients understand
that rationing is making their insurance affordable, and (3) health care ethical
norms [be] expanded to more comfortably address cases in which high costs are
not justified by minor expected results." Id.
62. See Christensen, supra note 59, at 223 ("Subscribers premiums or dues are
set by the marketplace .... [but the tradeoff is] reducing the amount spent on
doctors, tests, treatments and hospitalization.").
63. See Alice G. Gosfield, The Legal Subtext of the Managed Care Environment: A
Practitioner's Perspective, 23J.L. MED. & ETHics 230, 231 (1995) (discussing range of
health care data available to consumers). The amount and variety of health care
data is "dizzying, ranging from procedure and device effectiveness, to customer
satisfaction and disenrollment rates, to the extent of provision of preventative
health services with what outcomes to populations." Id. The commentator also
noted that "[t] he producers [of this data] range from public legislatively spawned
bodies ... to private managed care entities." Id.
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health care purchasing decisions based on this information? The range of
data that is already available for health care consumers is extensive. Ex-
isting sources include the National Committee on Quality Assurance
(NCQA), the Healthplan Employer Data and Information Set and the
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council.64 Many more will
be available in the future. Some believe that patients should be accounta-
ble for their health care choices when they make trade-offs between cost
and quality in choosing a health plan. 65 This puts a burden on patients
who may not have the sophistication necessary to meet it.
64. See Regan, supra note 28, at 674-75 ("[I] n 1990, an independent nonprofit
accreditation program known as the National Committee for Quality Assurance
(NCQA) was formed to evaluate and compare [managed care organizations]."); see
also Aynah V. Askanas, Physician Terminations in Managed Care: Why Are They Occur-
ring? How Do We Ensure They Are Just?, I HEALTH MATRIx, 67, 175 (stating that
NCQA devises report card for each HMO using what is known as "Healthplan Em-
ployer Data Information Set"); Robert Hackey, New Wine in Old Bottles: Certificate of
Need Enters the 1990s, 18 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 927, 931 (1993) (explaining
that Pennsylvania's Health Care Cost Containment Council has published "out-
comes data for each of the state's acute care hospitals since 1989").
65. See E. Haavi Morreim, Moral Justice and Legal Justice in Managed Care: The
Ascent of Contributive Justice, 23J. L., MED. & ETHICS 247, 254-55 (1995) (noting that
patients now face accountability for health care purchasing decisions). Moreover,
some courts take a strictly contractual approach to denial of coverage decisions
and emphasize that patients should bear some responsibilities in choosing health
care plans. See Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1407 (7th Cir.
1994) (expressing sympathy for plaintiff denied coverage, but rejecting such sym-
pathy as a basis for judicial recovery); Loyola Univ. of Chicago v. Humana Ins. Co.,
996 F.2d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 1993) (same).
In Humana, a participant in a group health plan provided by Humana Insur-
ance underwent heart surgery. Humana, 996 F.2d at 896. Problems during the
surgery left the attending surgeon with the option of letting the patient die or
implanting a total artifical heart. See id. at 897. The surgeon opted for the implant,
but the patient died two weeks later. See id. Humana refused to pay for the im-
plant because such procedures were considered experimental by the insurance
company. See id. According to the terms of the insurance plan, any experimental
procedures must be pre-approved. See id. at 901. In holding for Humana, the
court determined that because the case was brought in contract, the language of
the benefit plan controlled and the insurance company had the right to determine
what constituted experimental procedures. See id. at 903 (emphasizing that the
terms of the insurance plan controlled and that "Humana's humanity [was] not an
issue").
Similarly in Fuja, a participant in a group health plan sued her insurer for
failing to pay for what the insurance company deemed experimental treatment.
Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1407. The insurance company "refused to cover the treatment
because it did not fall within the parameters of procedures that are 'medically
necessary' as defined in the insurance contract." Id. As in Humana, the Fuja court
analyzed the case as a contract case and determined that the contract language was
unambiguous. Id. at 1412. Because the plaintiff, who was a plan participant, was
"informed that her treatment [would] be furnished in connection with medical
research," the procedure clearly fell within the prohibitory language of the con-
tract. See id. at 1410.
Therefore, Morreim concludes that judicial sentiment cannot always over-
come the notion that "patients can and should bear some responsibility for their
own conduct, both in choosing health plans and in fulfilling contractual obliga-
tions once they select one." Morreim, supra, at 255.
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V. A SUGGESTED ETHICAL PARADIGM FOR THE RESTRUCTURED HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY
A review of these new sets of ethical conflicts reveals a common
theme. All manifest the conflict between cost and quality in health care.
Large organizations, such as HMOs and IDSs, particularly when they are
structured on a for-profit basis, must control costs to survive and to thrive.
These organizations are more prominent in health care recently because
there is a need for new forces in the industry that can counter the recent
relentless rise in costs. At the same time, quality cannot ethically be com-
promised as a goal. It can be subjected to a balancing with cost factors,
but only up to a point because such fundamental interests rest on the
quality of health care received. The new ethical conflicts, therefore, can be
seen as tests of the limits of how far we can go in individual instances in
controlling costs at the expense of quality.
A. Maintaining the Value of the Best Interests of the Patient
One could conclude that all elements of the health care system
should be concerned solely with the best interests of the patients. The
history of health care cost increases has taught us, however, that larger
societal interests in cost control and access cannot be ignored. A balance
is needed. Conversely, if the interests of the patient are not always placed
first, we risk compromising a fundamental need. We may even create a
disincentive for patients to seek care at all for fear that the system is not
truly concerned with their welfare. In an industry that deals with life and
death, we must be extremely careful in limiting any responsibilities owed
to the customer.
B. A Suggested Paradigm: Rebuttable Presumption of Patient Primacy
One approach to resolving the ethical and legal conflicts described
above would be to use a process of shifting burdens of persuasion. Under
this approach, every health care decision would initially be measured ac-
cording to an overriding principle that it should first consider the best
interests of the patient. A decision that does not consider the patient's
interests first must then be justified by compelling cost or other considera-
tions that will benefit other goals that maintain the integrity of the health
care system. If such an alternative justification cannot be made, then an
ethical duty has been breached.
Under this paradigm, everyone's duty, including insurers, providers
and patients, involves a primary, but not absolute, obligation to maximize
the well-being of every individual patient entering the system. Every time a
competing goal comes into play, it must be demonstrated that individual
patient care was maximized to the extent possible before the other goal is
effectuated. It must also be shown that the competing goal has a desirable
impact on health care in some other way. The process of analyzing shift-
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ing burdens based on patient interests can apply to both the formulation
of overriding ethical principles and to legal rules that effectuate those
principles in individual cases.
For example, a doctor referring a patient out of network, contrary to
the dictates of a contract with an IDS or HMO could justify the decision to
his or her IDS or HMO as being in the best interests of the patient. This
would serve as an affirmative defense by the physician to a breach of con-
tract claim and would form a rebuttable presumption that the physician
acted appropriately. The employer could rebut this defense by arguing
that the interests of the patient in question did not outweigh the threat to
the financial integrity of the system. The dispute would be resolved
through a factual determination of the impact of the competing health
care goals under the facts of the specific case with the burden of persua-
sion on the party arguing against the individual patient's interests.
Another example would be the physician's duty to treat a patient
through a course of treatment regardless of payment-the legal and ethi-
cal duty not to abandon the patient. An ethical analysis would first look to
the patient's best interests, which in this case would require that the tradi-
tional duty apply and the physician be required to treat until a substitute
physician willing and qualified to take the patient is identified. What if the
patient must switch insurance plans and the new plan does not cover the
services of the first physician? The first physician's duty would be to deter-
mine that a substitute physician was available in the patient's new insur-
ance plan and to communicate clinical information to him or her, if
necessary. Once it became apparent that a suitable substitute is available in
the other system, the physician's duty to the patient would cease. The bur-
den would then shift to the new HMO or IDS to provide that continuing
care. If the new IDS or HMO did not have a suitable provider, the first
physician would be obliged to continue to treat the patient, although with
a claim against the new IDS or HMO for reimbursement for the services.
A third example involves the role of patients in advocating for their
own care. Could an HMO defend against a claim for wrongly denying care
by arguing that the patient did not vigorously pursue an appeal on his or
her own behalf? The first question in analyzing this situation would be
whether the interest of the patient were harmed through the denial of
care that was medically necessary. If he or she had been, then the next
question would be whether placing the burden on the patient to appeal
the claim denial can be justified by another health care goal, such as the
need to make patients active participants in care decisions to promote sen-
sitivity to costs. The HMO would have to demonstrate that such a policy
actually did control costs without unreasonably limiting necessary care.
The ultimate impact on health care, both of the individual patient and of
the larger cohort of patients receiving care under the same plan, would be
the guiding factors in analyzing the ethical duties of patients and of the
HMO. The burden of persuasion in a legal proceeding to assign liability
1998],
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for a breach of those duties would be on the party arguing against the
interests of the individual patient.
The exact balance of different ethical and legal duties under this par-
adigm would be determined as cases arise and the new industry structure
evolves. Regulators would enforce it in overseeing the industry, and courts
would enforce it in imposing liability standards. In essence, considerations
of patient care would not automatically resolve every conflict, but would
form the starting point for any analysis.
C. The Inherent Conflict in For-Profit Medicine Under the Suggested Paradigm
Some aspects of the reorganized health care industry may not be ame-
nable to a paradigm for ethical and legal analyses focused on the interests
of patients. In particular, for-profit corporate medicine may present an
ethical and legal paradigm of its own that is incompatible with a principle
that patient interests must always be considered first. For-profit medicine
used to mean individual physicians and other practitioners who made
money by providing services. Other elements of the system involving
larger corporate structures, such as hospitals and insurance companies,
were mostly structured on a nonprofit basis. Additionally, the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine limited for-profit corporate entry into
health care in most states.66
In the name of cost control, we have encouraged the creation of
larger corporate health care entities, such as those that own and operate
many HMOs. Exceptions to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
have been recognized to make these organizations legally permissible. 67
This new business structure has fostered many positive results, including
66. See Arnold J. Rosoff, The Business of Medicine: Problems with the Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 17 CUMB. L. REv. 485, 490 (1987) (describing origin,
justification and evolution of corporate practice of medicine doctrine). An exam-
ple of a typical state statute that embodies the doctrine reads in pertinent part:
"No corporation shall practice ... or hold itself out as practicing dentistry. No
person shall practice ... dentistry as an officer, agent or employee of any corpora-
tion, or under the name of any corporation. No person shall practice... dentistry
under any firm name or trade name .... " N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:6-12 (West 1996).
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine developed out of state licensure
acts, which prohibited and punished the unauthorized practice of medicine. See
Rosoff, supra, at 491. Generally, the doctrine was intended to prevent organiza-
tions from exploiting the health care field for profit. See id. More recently, how-
ever, "the involvement of corporations at all levels is pervasive, and is increasingly
accepted as legitimate and even desirable." Id. at 497. Despite this fact, many states
remain committed to the doctrine. See id.
67. See Mars, supra note 33, at 252 (noting that courts and legislatures have
permitted exceptions to corporate practice of medicine doctrine for professional
corporations, nonprofit hospitals and HMOs); see also George F. Indest, III & Bar-
bara A. Egolf, Is Medicine Headed for an Assembly Line? Exploring the Doctrine of the
Unauthorized Corporate Practice of Medicine, Bus. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 1997, at 32, 34-
35 (noting that "[c]ertain types of corporations may legally hire doctors or share in
its doctor-employee's income" such as professional service corporations, faculty-
practice plans and HMO or other managed care entities).
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more primary care, more coordinated care and more focus on patient
amenities. When organized on a for-profit basis, however, this structure
can also create conflicts of interest between business and medical ethical
responsibilities. 68 Managers of for-profit businesses have a fiduciary obli-
gation, recognized in ethics and in law, to put the interests of the equity
owners whom they serve first.69 How can they fulfill this obligation under
a paradigm that requires the customer's interests to be the focus of their
ethical and legal duties? It may be that the profit-making obligations of
for-profit corporate entities are too great to balance against the interests
of their customers, even if they are life and death interests. The paradigm
of placing patient care as the primary value in any ethical or legal analysis,
therefore, may not be consistent with the role and duties of a for-profit
corporation.
Nonprofit corporations, however, merely have an obligation to main-
tain fiscal health.70 This is a duty owed to bondholders, customers and the
general public. They do not have a duty to maximize short-term profits
for shareholders. 71 By devoting resources to patient care above the de-
68. See Mariner, supra note 56, at 237 (stating that in for-profit organizations,
"[e] thical principles are sometimes conflated with economic and political goals").
Managed care organizations focus on cutting costs and ensuring adequate returns
on investment to their shareholders. See id. "[Managed care organizations] face
difficulties when achievement of their mission to provide medical care conflicts
with their obligation to preserve their assets. This is especially true in the case of
for-profit [managed care organizations], which may be under pressure to maintain
stock prices and to pay dividends." Id. at 238.
Patients, however, rely on physicians to advise them and expect independent
judgment from the physician in making significant medical decisions for them. See
Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 246-55 (1995)
(discussing physicians' duties and potential conflicts of interests). Physicians can
abuse this trust by advancing their personal interests or those of other parties. See
id. Patients, however, are usually in a poor position to monitor physicians, to sec-
ond-guess their judgment or to discover and sanction breaches of trust. See id. at
246. "Physicians have divided loyalties when they perform roles other than patient
care .... In these cirumstances, pursuing legitimate roles may cause physicians to
act in ways that are not in the best interests of at least some of their patients." Id. at
251 (citation omitted). Conflict arises with regard to HMOs and other managed
care organizations because services that are only slightly profitable might be de-
nied to patients in order to "promote the institution's interest." Id. "Patients would
then be one of the many parties that have a claim on physicians' loyalty, but not
one that overrides the claims of other parties." Id. at 254.
69. See Mars, supra note 33, at 256 (noting difference between nonprofit and
for-profit organizations as latter's duty and ability to distribute earnings to manage-
ment, private shareholders or other institutional decision makers).
70. See Lewis D. Solomon & Kimberly J. Benjamin, Intentional Communities: A
Primer, 23 OHio N.U. L. REv. 143, 163 (1996) (stating that "managers of nonprofits
have a duty to donors and the general public to use funds entrusted to them in an
effective and proper manner").
71. See Andrea L. Castro, Comment, Overview of the Tax Treatment of Nonprofit
Hospitals and Their For-Profit Subsidiaries: A Short-Sighted View Could Be Very Bad
Medicine, 15 PACE L. Rxv. 501, 528 (1995) (noting that nonprofits do not face the
same bottom line pressures that for-profit organizations face); Hayward, supra note
1998] 495
29
Field: New Ethical Relationships under Health Care's New Structure: The
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
mands of shareholders and of the market, they are not breaching a fiduci-
ary duty and they are not subject to a conflict of interest.
The operations of nonprofit corporations are subject to substantial
criticism, much of it with merit.72 It is argued that nonprofit health care
corporations can behave with the same competitive fierceness as for-prof-
its. 73 In many markets, hospitals and health care systems are extremely
aggressive in seeking market share from competitors.74 Many for-profit
corporations object to the tax advantages that nonprofit organizations en-
joy, arguing that their role and behavior are no different. 75 There is con-
siderable debate, moreover, as to whether nonprofit hospitals provide
more indigent care than their for-profit counterparts. 76
33, at 410 (discussing absence of conflict between professional and profit motives
in nonprofit organizations); Mars, supra note 33, at 257-58 (noting that earnings in
nonprofits cannot be distributed to private shareholders, but instead must be used
for tax-exempt activities).
72. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 457, 463-64
(1996).
73. See Brody, id. at 490 (arguing that competition exists between nonprofits
that will weed out nonperforming or nonresponsive organizations). Nonprofits, in
short, struggle to survive and to achieve their goals, just like every other organiza-
tion. See id. at 469.
The notion that nonprofit organizations are just as competitive as for-profit
organizations was successfully raised and argued by a county seeking to limit the
tax-exempt status of a nonprofit health system that claimed to be a charity. See
Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 276 (Utah 1985)
(finding that nonprofit defendant generated income substantially higher than its
expenses). The court stated that "there is serious question regarding the constitu-
tional propriety of subsidies from Utah County taxpayers being used to give certain
entities a substantial competitive edge in what is essentially a commericial market-
place." Id.
74. See Brody, supra note 72, at 469 (noting that nonprofits compete for direc-
tors, donations, government contracts and grants, employees, volunteers and clien-
tele); Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 131, 132 (1993) ("As of 1990, revenues generated by nonprofits
accounted for roughly fifteen percent of the nation's gross national product.").
75. See Mars, supra note 33, at 256 (noting that to get tax-exempt status non-
profits must comply with § 501 (c) (3) of Internal Revenue Code). To receive tax-
exempt status, nonprofit corporations must be "organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific ... or educational purposes . I.R.C.
§ 501 (c) (3) (1994).
One commentator has noted that "today's not-for-profit hospitals are being
heavily scrutinized and criticized for their lack of commitment to charitable pur-
poses." Mars, supra note 33, at 256. They are tending to approximate for-profit
entities in their structure and their behavior. See id. (arguing that if nonprofits
imitate for-profit entities, then nonprofit exception to corporate practice doctrine
appears to be arbitrary).
76. See INSTITUTE OF MED., FoR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 101 (Brad-
ford H. Gray ed., 1986); see also M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline:
Medical Care and the Charitable Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REv. 299, 316-17 (1995) (stat-
ing that difference in amount of below-cost care provided to poor by nonprofit
and for-profit corporations is "bitterly disputed"). One commentator noted:
[Vol. 43: p. 467
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Nonprofit corporations, however, do not face the same pressures as
for-profits to ignore other values in favor of profits. There are no share-
holders and investment analysts to answer to in terms of stock price and
dividends.7 7 The boards of nonprofit organizations are generally uncom-
pensated and have no equity interest in the organization. 78 The perform-
ance of the board is not measured in terms of share price, but in terms of
the success of the organization's community mission. 79 Board members
can meet their ethical and fiduciary obligations by considering patient
care as their primary concern in a way that for-profit directors would find
more difficult.
Nonprofit corporations are also often criticized as inefficient.80 To
the extent that they are buffered from profit-making pressures, they can
Studies of comparable nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, matched on the
basis of community demographics and patient characteristics, have not
shown a significant difference in rates of uncompensated care. Thus the
proposition that the nonprofit form itself generates more free and below-
cost care than for-profit form is inconsistent with the available data.
Id. at 317-18. Another commentator suggested that part of the reason for the de-
cline of medical services for indigent patients is that nonprofits can no longer
compete with for-profit hospitals that have began to capture the medical market.
See A. Kay B. Roska, Comment, Nonprofit Hospitals: The Relationship Between Charita-
ble Tax Exemptions and Medical Care for Indigents, 43 Sw. L.J. 759, 780-81 (1989). As a
result, nonprofits "changed their focus from caring for the sick and the poor to
attracting paying patients." See id. (arguing that state legislatures should address
this problem by establishing treatment of poor as prerequisite to charitable tax-
exempt status).
77. See Mars, supra note 33, at 257 (stating general rule that earnings of non-
profit organizations cannot be distributed to private shareholders or manage-
ment); see also DeMott, supra note 74, at 132 (noting primary difference between
for-profit and nonprofit organizations is that nonprofit organizations cannot pay
dividends or distribute net income to persons who control them). Stated simply,
"[m] embers of a nonprofit.., do not have a proprietary interest in the corpora-
tion comparable to the interest that shareholders have in a for-profit corporation."
Id.
78. See DeMott, supra note 74, at 140 ("Most nonprofits do not compensate
their directors directly."). But see Mars, supra note 33, at 257-58 (noting that
although income cannot be distributed to management or shareholders of non-
profit organization, nonprofits might distribute large salaries to hospital adminis-
trators or employ excessively large staffs).
79. Compare Mary Frances Budig et al., Pledges to Nonprofit Organizations: Are
They Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced?, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 47, 63 (1992) ("Non-
profit corporations operate to achieve the organization's specific public, charita-
ble, or religious purposes."), with Robin Dimieri and Stephen Weiner, The Public
Interest and Governing Boards of Nonprofit Health Care Institutions, 34 VAND. L. REv.
1029, 1038 (1981) (noting that nonprofit organization's profit margin is measure
of organization's efficiency and effectiveness). In nonprofit organizations, how-
ever, one cannot use only one factor to measure efficiency and effectiveness be-
cause economic efficiency is not always the most effective means of achieving the
organization's purpose. See id. (noting factors utilized in measurement of perform-
ance in nonprofit and for-profit organizations).
80. See Brody, supra note 72, at 463-64 (noting that there is no guarantee that
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be more wasteful of resources and less attentive to customer needs. These
inefficiencies may be lessening, however, because of the competitive pres-
sures to maintain efficiency in dealing with HMOs. Inefficient nonprofit
corporations cannot survive under managed care because the low reim-
bursement rates will not permit it.8 1 If nonprofit corporations can survive
in the new structure of the health care industry, they will have to be more
efficient and sensitive to their customers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The restructuring of the health care industry in response to the
spread of managed care is having profound effects on basic relationships
between players in the system. The result is a set of new ethical obligations
that balance the interests of individual patients and the integrity of the
overall system and of its components. This balance reflects a level of com-
plexity and contradictions in ethical and business relationships in health
care that we have not yet seen. The industry, however, has reached a level
of organizational sophistication that we have not previously seen. Within
this new complex system, clinical quality may be lost as a value if it is not
treated as a starting point for any ethical analysis. Those operating the
system should be in an ethical position to accord it this measure of
significance.
81. See id. at 492 (noting that survival is "measure of a nonprofit organiza-
tion's effectiveness"). Survival means that "'important functions of effective acqui-
sition and maintenance of resources are performed.'" See id. (quoting Richard D.
Heimovics & Robert D. Herman, The Salient Management Skills: A Conceptual Frame-
work for a Curriculum for Managers in Nonprofit Organizations, 19 Am. REV. PUB. AD-
MIN. 295, 302 (1989)).
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